fix: Reject ERC-1155 batch transfers whose aggregate quantity overflows

The ERC-1155 batch_transfer parser accumulates per-id values into
context->value via add256() to compute the total quantity displayed
on the review screen. add256 wraps on uint256 overflow without
signalling, so a crafted calldata whose values sum past 2^256 would
silently produce a truncated total - a hostile dApp could pair a
benign-looking aggregate with adversarial per-id quantities.

After each accumulation, detect overflow by checking
gt256(&new_value, &context->value): when the running total is now
smaller than the addend, the sum has wrapped. Set the plugin result
to ERROR so the host cannot present a misleading review screen.

(cherry picked from commit 2f24a04bcfa6d4faf0b455d19a59ff10bb380c51)